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This article explores the influence of classical liberalism’s critique of land monopoly on American progressivism. It 
shows that urban machines, many influenced by Henry George, drew on the liberal canon to argue that railroads, 
telegraphs, and water power were natural monopolies because they relied upon access to finite and unique plots of 
land. It demonstrates that these ideas helped shift progressivism toward policies intended to socialize rights-of-way. 
Ultimately, it concludes that progressivism’s lopsided focus on utilities and land reflect the priorities of classical 
liberalism and represent continuity in the liberal tradition.1 
 
Historians have often observed that American progressives were particularly concerned with certain 
industries identified as natural monopolies.2 Accounting for the origins of this interest, however, has been 
difficult. There has never been a universally agreed-upon definition of “natural monopoly.” Henry Carter 
Adams, in The Relation of the State to Industrial Action, defined natural monopolies as businesses that 
produce increasing returns as they grow in scale.3 Some progressives associated natural monopolies with 
industries that were essential to the life of the community. That is why Americans today refer to them as 
“utilities.”4 Modern economists sometimes identify natural monopolies as industries that require heavy 
fixed entrance costs for which duplication would be impractical or wasteful.5  
                                                 
1 This article has been presented as a paper on two panels and so I am indebted to several scholars who have read it 
and provided comments. Charles McCann, Elizabeth Sanders, Charles Postel, Patrick Dixon, Richard John, and Stephen 
Meardon have all made suggestions that have helped advance the progress of the paper into an article. Thanks are due 
to each of them. 
2 Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1998), 107–8. Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order 1877–1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 52–53. 
3 Henry Carter Adams, “Relation of the State to Industrial Action,” Publication of the American Economic Association 1 
(January 1887): 472–549. Hsihui Chang and Raj Mashruwala, “Was the Bell System a Natural Monopoly? An 
Application of Data Envelopment Analysis,” Annuals of Operations Research 145 (July 2006): 251–63. 
4 Richard John, Network Nation: Inventing American Telecommunications (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 
266. 
5 Holley H. Ulbrich, “Natural Monopoly in Principle Textbooks: A Pedagogical Note,” Journal of Economic Education 
(Spring 1991): 179–81. C.R. McConnell, Elements of Economic Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), 373. C.R. 
McConnell, Principles of Economic Analysis, 10th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987), 537, 578. Balkisu Saidu, “Regulating 
the Abuse of the Natural Monopoly of Pipelines in the Gas Industry vis-à-vis the Provision of Third Party Access,” 
Journal of Structured Finance 13 (Winter 2008): 105–12. Klaus-Gunter Becker, “Essays on the Sustainability of Natural 
Monopoly” (PhD diss., University of Kansas, 1987). 
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Manuel Mosca has identified the origins of the term “natural monopoly” in classical economics, where 
it referred to “natural agents supplied in fixed quantity, also including talent and location.” Natural 
monopolies were generally understood as industries that required access to land with scarce resources or 
uniquely advantageous locations. However, Mosca argues that this understanding of natural monopoly 
fell out of favour over the course of the nineteenth century: 
 
We can see here that there has been a gradual shift from the meaning of monopoly 
derived from fixed-supply natural agents to one deriving from the production 
process, with a period of overlapping of the two; we can also see that the latter 
sense crowded out the former in a period in which it was generally thought that 
natural monopolies due to technology were much more important than the 
others.6 
 
This article argues that, if understandings of natural monopoly rooted in land lost favour in the 
academy, they remained salient in the political class, particularly among policy professionals. This is due, 
in large part, to the influence of Henry George, who precipitated a backlash in the academic community, 
but whose ideas won sway in urban political machines, seeping down to the bureaucratic class thus 
employed.7 Henry George’s understanding of natural monopoly proved to be more than a theoretical issue. 
It focused public scrutiny on industries that relied upon extensive access to finite space or unique sites of 
extraction. It promoted policies, such as original cost valuation, that ensured utilities were unable to 
capitalize land values during rate disputes and made little, if any, sense without the assumption that 
monopolies derived their profits from the growing value of urban real estate.  
This article identifies an unusually coherent strand of liberal thought that stretches from classical 
liberalism through to the New Deal. Historians have largely abandoned the concept of a unified progressive 
movement for a consensus that recognizes “varieties” of progressivism.8 However, most historians argue 
that progressives were drawn to ideas about “order” or “efficiency” rather than traditional liberal faiths 
such as freedom or competition.9 Thomas Leonard has gone so far as to brand progressives “illiberal 
reformers.”10 With Atlantic Crossings, Daniel Rodgers inspired a focus on German universities, where 
progressive intellectuals were trained in critiques of liberalism and acquired a faith in the efficacy of state 
power.11 Hence, when Eric Foner wrote The Story of American Freedom, the progressive era stood out as an 
                                                 
6 Manuela Mosca, “On the Origins of the Concept of Natural Monopoly: Economies of Scale and Competition,” 
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 15 (June 2008): 323–4. 
7 These were not the typical machines built on patronage. However, Tom Johnson was happy to acknowledge that he 
was a “boss” who ran a machine. Johnson rallied public opinion and used dirty tricks to guarantee an exceptional level 
of control over the party and all the organs of municipal government. Carl Lorenz, Tom L. Johnson: Mayor of Cleveland 
(New York: S.A. Barnes, 1911), 46–47. 
8 Peter Filene, “An Obituary for the ‘Progressive Movement,” American Quarterly 22 (Spring 1970): 20–34. Daniel T. 
Rodgers, “In Search of Progressivism,” Reviews in American History 10 (December 1982): 113–32.  
9 Samuel Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890–1920 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1959). Samuel Hays, The Response to Industrialism, 1885–1914 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, [1957] 1995). Wiebe, The Search for Order. Robert H. Wiebe, Self-Rule: A Cultural History of American Democracy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).  
10 Thomas C. Leonard, Illiberal Reformers: Race, Eugenics, and American Economics in the Progressive Era (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2016). 
11 Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings, 77. Axel R. Shafer, American Progressives and German Social Reform, 1875–1920 (Germany: 
Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, 2000). Leon Fink, The Long Gilded Age: American Capitalism and the Lessons of a New World 
Order (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 63–89. Frederic C. Howe, for example, has been depicted 
as a student of German social thought, even though he was a Georgist who identified as a liberal. Although Howe 
History of Intellectual Culture, 2014-16 
 
3 
aberration in which tropes like freedom and liberty had become “tainted” so that “progressive 
commentators preferred to speak instead of democracy and its discontents.”12 This strand of historical 
interpretation, however, seems to understate the continuing appeal of liberalism, considering that 
Woodrow Wilson won the presidency under the banner of the “New Freedom.”13 
While liberalism has not been banished from progressive-era historiography, few historians envision 
it as an intellectually coherent philosophy of reform. Even the consensus school, which argued for the 
ubiquity of liberalism in American history, believed its persistence was a function of its imprecision.14 Gary 
Gerstle tried to account for liberalism’s evolution by describing it as a loose “protean” philosophy.15 As 
Jeffery Lustig observed, “for some, imprecision itself is definitive of modern liberalism.”16 Those who have 
tried to identify a coherent process of evolution in American liberal thought have generally contended that 
liberalism moderated itself to forestall radical threats against capitalism.17 Most recently, Nancy Cohen has 
argued that classical liberals adopted regulation to control the market and ensure that popular government 
did assume direct ownership of capital.18 
At the heart of the issue is how we remember classical liberalism. Modern libertarians imagine 
themselves as the inheritors of classical liberalism, a conceit that scholars often exacerbate when they 
identify present-day apostles of the market as “neoliberals.”19 Similarly, progressive era historians have 
been uncritical in their acceptance of German historicists’ caricatures of liberalism. Ajay Mehrotra, for 
example, argues that progressive proponents of ability-to-pay taxation ushered in a conceptual revolution 
by introducing German economics and “discredit[ing] . . . Victorian theories of atomistic individualism and 
                                                 
appreciated German administrative efficiency, he claimed that it represented the “socialism of the ruling caste” and 
used the trope of the “The Dual Germany” to convey his ambivalence. This contrasts with his unrelentingly positive 
treatment of Denmark, where a measure of land value taxation had been established. Frederic C. Howe, Denmark: A 
Cooperative Commonwealth (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1921), iii. Frederic C. Howe, Socialized Germany (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1917), 1. Shafer, American Progressives, 113–23. 
12 Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 140. 
13 This overlaps slightly with Robert Johnston’s argument that historians have understated progressivism’s 
“democratic” elements. Robert D. Johnston, “Re-Democraticizing the Progressive Era: The Politics of Progressive Era 
Political Historiography,” The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 1, no. 1 (January 2002): 68–92.  
14 Hartz claimed that Americans understood liberalism so poorly as a philosophy that it was “a stranger in the land of 
its greatest realization and fulfillment.” Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American 
Political Thought Since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955), 11. 
15 Gary Gerstle, “The Protean Character of American Liberalism,” American Historical Review (October 1994): 1043–73. 
16 R. Jeffery Lustig, Corporate Liberalism: The Origins of Modern American Political Theory, 1890–1920 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1982), 4.  
17 Martin Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890–1916 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 34. Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900–1916 (New York: The 
Free Press, 1963), 1, 279, 305. James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900–1918 (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1968).  
18 Nancy Cohen, The Reconstruction of American Liberalism, 1865–1914 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2002), 137.  
19 “But the turbulent 20th century soon cast a dark cloud on the ‘truths’ of classical liberalism. It wasn’t until the 1980s 
that ‘neoliberals’ managed to bring back some of the quaint ideas—albeit dressed in new garments.” Manfred B. Steger 
and Ravi K. Roy, Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 5. Other definitions 
of “neoliberalism,” which figure it as, for example, “a reorganization of capital,” go further in suggesting that liberalism 
can be understood, in Marxist terms, as a superstructure that reflects the needs of capital. Al Campbell, “The Birth of 
Neoliberalism in the United States: A Reorganization of Capitalism” in Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader (London: Pluto 
Press, 2005), 187.  
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laissez-faire political economy.”20 Such a stark contrast appears to be overdrawn since, by Mehrotra’s own 
accounting, both Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill made the case for “ability to pay” long before German 
historicism had emerged as a coherent school of economic thought.21  
British historiography suggests a more generous and progressive understanding of liberalism. Peter 
Clarke argues that the New Liberalism of the early twentieth century merged liberalism and socialism into 
a coherent philosophy.22 Many British historians have found the seeds of this change even earlier. Nicholas 
Capaldi notes that John Stuart Mill was an avid supporter of land reform, an occasional advocate of 
workers’ co-operatives, and an admirer of the socialist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon.23 Ideas about land and 
monopoly, from the classical liberal tradition, served as the blueprint for New Liberalism. Peter Weiler 
explains that:  
 
Individualist liberals had always recognized that monopolies, the prime example 
of which was aristocratic land-holding, remained uncontrolled by the market and 
threatened the public interest. The new liberals extended this classical view of 
monopolies to other forms of property. At the same time, they continued to mount 
a campaign to attack problems specifically arising from the private ownership of 
land. . . . Recognizing that wealth was socially created, a view which could be in 
part derived from the recognition of the social creation of landed wealth, the new 
liberals justified differentiating between earned and unearned wealth.24  
 
The Atlantic Ocean was no barrier at all against the spread of New Liberalism. In fact, American 
radicalism was a catalyst for it. Specifically, Henry George’s demonstration that land values were created 
by society served as one of the primary inspirations for liberalism’s new attack on unearned wealth.25 
George turned liberal rights-based arguments on their head, reasoning that the community had property 
rights as inviolable as the individual. The idea that factors with a static supply accrued socially created 
rents would be used by the British Fabians to argue that society had a claim on a vast array of factors in a 
modern economy, including even unique or rare individual talents.26 But, even in George’s narrower 
formulation, this New Liberalism meant that several of the most important industries in the modern 
economy properly belonged to the people.  
New Liberals are not easily sorted into modern political categories, but we should be sceptical of the 
contention that they were more backward looking than progressives who broke ranks with the liberal 
tradition. New Liberals generally retained a faith that market capitalism was the optimal way to organize 
many sectors of the economy, but also believed that few substitutes were available to direct public 
ownership of monopolistic factors. This contrasts with social scientists trained in the German school, many 
of whom acquiesced to existing property arrangements so long as they were subject to technocratic 
                                                 
20 Ajay Mehrotra, Making the Modern American Fiscal State: Law, Politics, and the Rise of Progressive Taxation, 1877–1929 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 10. 
21 Ibid., 110–11. 
22 Peter Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 405–7. 
23 Nicholas Capaldi, John Stuart Mill: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 350–6. Michael 
Barker, Gladstone and Radicalism: The Reconstruction of the Liberal Party in Britain, 1885–1894 (Sussex: Harvester Press, 
1975), 96. 
24 Peter Weiler, The New Liberalism: Liberal Social Theory in Great Britain 1889–1914 (New York: Garland Publishing. 1982), 
6–7. Stefan Collini, Liberalism and Sociology: L.T. Hobhouse and Political Argument in England, 1880–1915 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979).  
25 Michael Freeden, The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 43. 
26 Mrs. Townshend, “The Case for School Nurseries,” Fabian Tract No. 145 (London: The Fabian Society, 1909), 14. 
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supervision by experts of their own class. German-trained scholars embraced many vestiges of feudalism 
they observed in Germany, including the disenfranchisement of the poor and the placement of power in 
the hands of unelected administrators. A generous assessment would regard them as paternalistic, but 
most observers would conclude that they were at least partially driven by a thinly veiled suspicion that 
regulatory regimes were the best means to serve the class interests of a nascent clique of university-trained 
professionals. As Axel Shafer shows, American academics “were greatly impressed by the respect their 
German mentors enjoyed from the community and desired for themselves the same professional status.” 
Regulatory commissions were a means to “carve out a sphere of influence for themselves” to the detriment 
of both capitalists and the immigrants that they derided for their “ignorance and depravity.”27 Historicists’ 
critiques of liberalism, therefore, should not be construed as unassailably objective scholarship, but as an 
expression of social interests which were themselves relatively conservative.28  
 
The History of “Land Monopoly”  
 
The idea that land is a monopoly has a long lineage, dating back to Adam Smith. In The Wealth of Nations, 
Smith claimed that “the rent of land . . . is naturally a monopoly price.”29 Land monopoly, for Smith, was 
not a function of concentrated ownership. Instead, Smith argued that land was a monopoly because it 
existed in a fixed quantity and scarcity prevented supply from meeting demand. As a corollary, certain 
industries were also natural monopolies.30 Smith cited fine viniculture as an example. He noted that 
because fine wines could be grown only in rare types of soil in specific regions, open admission to the 
market was physically impossible. Smith claimed that the high rates of interest in viniculture were 
monopolistic land rents, indirectly paid by the consumers in the commodity value of wine.31 
Smith’s notion that land was a monopoly became an accepted feature of the liberal canon. Thomas 
Malthus seems to have coined the term “natural monopoly” when he referred to “peculiar products of the 
earth . . . which may be called natural and necessary monopolies.”32 Similarly, David Ricardo, a famous 
advocate for the taxation of land, described land as innately a “partial monopoly.”33 John Stuart Mill 
provided a more comprehensive treatment of how land restricted competition. Mill defined monopoly as 
any instance in which “value is determined by a natural or artificial limitation of quantity.”34 Using this 
definition, Mill noted that identifying land as a monopoly “may not be exact but is suggestive of more of 
the true than the false.”35 Mill observed that more land could be brought into the market, for example, by 
building taller buildings or expanding transportation systems. Yet certain plots of land would always have 
special qualities that made them irreplaceable. Mill, in an example clearly applicable to railroads, referred 
to “monopoly rents paid for advantageous situations in popular thoroughfares.”36 
                                                 
27 Schafer, American Progressives, 40, 56, 62.  
28 Leonard, Illiberal Reformers, 17–26. 
29 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature of the Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London: A. Strahan, T. Cadell, 1799), 1: 
225, 2: 131. 
30 “Some natural productions require such a singularity of soil and situation, that all the land of a great country . . . may 
not be sufficient to supply the effectual demand.” Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1: 91.  
31 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1: 241–2. 
32 Thomas Malthus, An Inquiry into the Nature and Progress of Rent, and the Principles by Which It Is Regulated (1815; repr. 
New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 13. 
33 David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817; repr. London: G. Bell and Sons, 1911), 268. 
34 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy (1848; repr. New York: D. Appleton, 1897), 2: 120. 
35 Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 3: 107. 
36 Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 2: 429. 
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When Henry George published Progress and Poverty in 1879, he became the focal point of intersecting 
concerns about land and utilities. Approximately five million copies of his books, in which he advocated a 
single tax that would confiscate land rent, were distributed throughout the world. George appealed to 
urban tenants, arguing that wealth inequality existed because “there are lots for which for every square 
foot of frontage the owner may draw more than an average mechanic can earn.”37 He asserted that poverty 
persisted despite social and technological progress because rising population and mass production put 
growing pressure on a static land base, making it dearer and making those who owned wealth, wealthier.  
George made public ownership of utilities a central part of his platform, noting that “businesses which 
are in their nature monopolies are properly part of the functions of the State, and should be assumed by 
the State.”38 Government ownership was radical enough for the time that some of his followers were 
reticent to follow his lead. But, when the Single Tax League removed government ownership from its 
platform in 1893, George left the organization.39 The league crumbled. Most sectors of the movement 
subsequently accepted that public ownership of natural monopolies was an integral part of the Georgist 
platform.  
Although George was more radical than earlier liberals, his theory was firmly rooted in their tradition. 
The idea that land would increase in value with progress was based on David Ricardo’s theory of rent, 
according to which the landlord would demand in rent the whole advantage provided by his land relative 
to the least useful land in use.40 George’s primary innovation was demonstrating that urban real estate 
provided an economic advantage exponentially greater than the best farm land, increasing rent far beyond 
what classical liberals had imagined likely.  
George’s demonstration that urban growth increased real estate values furthermore established that 
the value of land was the product of a community’s development. John Locke had argued that the right to 
property was derived from one’s ownership of oneself and thus, by extension, to what one made. However, 
if the community had collectively created the value of land, then it stood to reason that this process of 
creation entitled it to an equally valid proprietary claim to land.41 This was a revolutionary syllogism that 
New Liberals extended to argue that many economic factors could, under classical liberal property theory, 
be construed as communal property. But it differed only in degrees from the dogma of classical liberalism. 
John Stuart Mill, for example, had called the rising value of land the “unearned increment” and advocated 
taxing it out of existence.42  
George’s reception in academic circles was ambivalent, but academics eventually distanced themselves 
from both George and the Ricardian liberalism that he had radicalized. Richard T. Ely, who helped 
popularize the term “natural monopoly,” initially accepted George’s place in the mainstream of economics. 
He observed in 1888 that “unfortunate as have been some of the phases of the agitation of Henry George, I 
cannot but think that the world owes him a debt of gratitude for placing in a clear light before the masses 
                                                 
37 Henry George, Progress and Poverty (1879; repr. New York: Appleton, 1886), 217. 
38 George, Progress and Poverty, 370. The idea that land was a uniquely problematic form of property was so ingrained 
in classical liberal thought that even Herbert Spencer concluded that “equity . . . does not permit property in land.” 
Herbert Spencer, Social Statistics or Conditions Essential to Human Happiness (London: John Chapman, 1851), 115. Thus, 
Horace White of the Nation wrote Henry George upon reading Progress and Poverty: “I agree with you in principle on 
what is called Land Monopoly and if I disagree as to any part of your argument it relates to the amount of [illegible] 
desirable to the landless from the carrying out of the proposed reform. The taxing power of the state may eventually, I 
think, confiscate Rent, but it will be a long time.” Horace White to Henry George, 17 December 1881, Henry George 
Papers, New York Public Library.  
39 Rhoda Hellman, Henry George Reconsidered (New York: Carlton Press, 1987), 109. 
40 Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy, 44–56. 
41 John Locke, Two Treatises on Government (London: R. Butler, Bruton-Street, 1821), 209.  
42 Freeden, The New Liberalism, 43. David Martin, John Stuart Mill and the Land Question (Hull: University of Hull 
Publications, 1981). 
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the fact that land is a natural monopoly.”43 Relations between single-taxers and academia deteriorated two 
years later, when George debated economists at the American Association of Social Science and E.R.A. 
Seligman made a forceful case against accepting amateurs — particularly George — into the discipline.44 
In 1900, Ely reversed his estimation of George and rejected the idea that land was a monopoly. To reach 
this conclusion, Ely repudiated Mill’s definition of monopoly as the systematic limitation in supply. Ely 
instead transitioned to a modern definition of monopoly, defining it as firms that exercise “unified control 
over the entire business.”45 
This repudiation of the classic definition of monopoly was often correlated with support for private 
ownership of utilities. The German-trained Charles Francis Adams established the Massachusetts Board of 
Railroad Commissioners that served as “national prototype of the so-called weak regulatory commission.” 
Adams argued that railroad monopoly was about efficiency. “The cheapest possible transport” could be 
obtained by “directing the largest possible volume of movement through the fewest possible channels.”46 
Because concentration in the railroads was a function of increasing returns to scale, rather than physical 
impediments to competition, the growth of railroad monopoly was a natural, almost positive function of 
industrial development that needed to be regulated, but not socialized. Similarly, Henry Carter Adams 
criticized liberalism, in part, because it “renders it impossible for men to realize the benefits that arise, in 
certain lines of business, from organization in the form of a monopoly.”47 According to Adams, some 
businesses naturally became more efficient as they increased in scale and “businesses which conform to the 
principle of increasing returns . . . come under the rule of centralized control. Such businesses are by nature 
monopolies.”48 While confident that natural monopolies required “public control,” Adams was lukewarm 
about the prospect of public ownership.49 Similarly, Ely’s drift away from Ricardian theory coincided with 
his embrace of private ownership of utilities. By the time Ely euphemized rent into “land income,” he was 
widely seen as a shill for utility companies as a result of his work with the Institute for Research in Land 
and Public Utility Economics.50  
 
Urban Radicalism, The New Liberalism, and Utility Reform  
 
Despite pushback from the academy, during the first two decades of the twentieth century Georgism 
flourished among urban reformers and policymakers. New York City had a Georgist tax assessor through 
most of the teens, and the city’s mayor, William Jay Gaynor, supported legislation that would move the 
city’s tax base gradually toward the single tax.51 In referendums, residents of San Francisco, Los Angeles, 
and Everett, Washington voted in favour of land value taxation.52 These proposals were typically blocked 
by rural voters for whom taxes on land were anathema. When Missouri voted on a single-tax referendum, 
                                                 
43 Richard T. Ely, Problems of Today: A Discussion (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1888), 113. 
44 The Single Tax Discussion Held at Saratoga Sept. 5, 1890 (New York: American Social Science Association, 1890), 84–85. 
45 Richard T. Ely, Monopolies and Trusts (London: MacMillan, 1900), 32–33.  
46 Charles Francis Adams, “Railway Commissions,” Journal of Social Science 2 (1870): 234. Thomas McCraw, Prophets of 
Regulation (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1984), 10, 57. 
47 Adams, “Relation of the State to Industrial Action,” 502. 
48 Ibid., 528. 
49 Henry Carter Adams, The Science of Finance: An Investigation of Public Expenditures and Public Revenues (New York: 
Henry Holt, 1899), 5. 
50 Richard T. Ely, “Land Income,” Political Science Quarterly 43, no. 3 (Sept. 1928): 408–27. Fink’s evidence that Ely 
remained engage in progressive causes after the board of regents investigated his political advocacy contradicts the 
long-standing belief that this investigation was the principal catalyst for his drift toward conservatism. Fink, The Long 
Gilded Age, 75–76. 
51 William Jay Gaynor, Some of Mayor Gaynor’s Letters and Speeches (New York: Greaves, 1913), 214–21. 
52 The Public, 6 December 1912. The Public, 22 November 1912. 
History of Intellectual Culture, 2014-16 
 
8 
42 percent of the residents of St. Louis voted in favour, but outside of the state’s four largest cities, it secured 
only 5 percent of the vote. Speakers in favour of the proposal, including one British MP, were physically 
assaulted in rural Missouri.53 In Pennsylvania, however, high rents pushed the state legislature to allow 
Pittsburgh and Scranton to impose steeper taxes on land than on physical structures.54  
Tom Johnson, congressman and mayor of Cleveland, was pivotal in popularizing Georgist approaches 
to utility issues. Johnson had been a streetcar magnate before he was goaded into reading George’s Social 
Problems. Reading Social Problems and Progress and Poverty changed Johnson’s life, which he now dedicated 
to realizing George’s utopia. Johnson served as George’s campaign manager when he ran for mayor of New 
York City in both 1886 and 1897. When he was elected to Congress in 1890, Johnson read all of George’s 
Protection or Free Trade into the Congressional Record and then used franking privileges to ship over a million 
copies on the public dime. Throughout Johnson’s tenure in Congress, George served as something like a 
tutor, mentoring him and even drafting legislation that Johnson presented to Congress.55 After George’s 
death in 1897, the movement’s centre of gravity shifted to Johnson and his attempts to provide a practical 
demonstration of George’s ideas as mayor of Cleveland.  
When Johnson was elected mayor of Cleveland in 1900, he began one of the nation’s most publicized 
utility reform campaigns. Johnson declared himself in favour of municipal ownership of utilities but, 
barred by the state constitution from realizing that policy, he began with a campaign to cap streetcar fares 
at 3 cents. The Public, a Georgist periodical that Johnson subsidized, explained that with cheaper fares, 
consumers would want to live near the transit system and that “the consequent rise in land values, giving 
to landlords the money value of these municipal benefits, will popularize Henry George’s single tax 
reform.”56 
More quietly, Johnson also began a technocratic battle to introduce Georgist ideas about land values 
into utility valuation. Johnson tasked two members of his administration, Edward Bemis and Peter Witt, 
with an extensive study of property taxes in Ohio. This study purported to show that while homes were 
assessed at 60 percent of their actual value, railroads were assessed at only 10 to 20 percent.57 Bemis and 
Witt argued that assessors were not accounting for how railroad construction augmented the value of the 
real estate under the tracks. Newton D. Baker, Johnson’s city solicitor, argued to the State Board of 
Equalization that the monopoly value of railroads was inherent in their rights-of-way, which were subject 
to the property tax: “the value which property derives from its use, from being in a certain place at a certain 
time, from its relation to other property, is in reality its entire value.”58 Baker claimed that taxing railroads 
without assessing premiums for space in high traffic areas was like taxing a house without considering its 
location. Land values, as George had argued, were created by the surrounding community.  
Although Tom Johnson is best remembered for his war on the streetcar system, he identified other 
important industries as monopolies, particularly electricity generation. As early as 1903, Tom Johnson 
asked all the municipal candidates to sign a pledge vowing to support public ownership of electricity. 
Twenty-three out of thirty-two members of the City Council signed the pledge.59 In 1905, Cleveland 
annexed two nearby suburbs to acquire power plants that could deliver cheap electricity to municipal 
services. When Johnson’s protégé, Newton Baker, was elected mayor in 1912, he campaigned for a public 
                                                 
53 Arthur Young, The Single Tax Movement in the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1916), 197. G.H. 
Moser to Frank Walsh, 7 February 1913, box 1, Frank Walsh Papers, New York Public Library. 
54 Young, The Single Tax Movement in the United States, 210–13.  
55 Tom Johnson, My Story (New York: B.W. Huebsch, 1911), 63. 
56 The Public, 13 April 1901. 
57 The Public, 15 June 1901.  
58 The Public, 14 September 1901. Edward Bemis, “Report of Prof. Edward Bemis on the True Value of Ohio Railroads 
for the Purpose of Taxation. Prepared at the Request of Hon. Tom L. Johnson, Mayor of Cleveland” (Cleveland, n.d.). 
59 The Public, 28 March 1903. 
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electric company large enough to serve the whole city. After a bruising fight, Baker managed to build a 
public power plant in Cleveland that provided the city with electricity at less than half the rate that the 
private company had charged. 
This connection between land and utilities was conveyed to a mass audience by Johnson’s 
propagandists. Frederic C. Howe, Johnson’s representative in the state legislature, was one of the nation’s 
leading figures in municipal reform; he would eventually serve in the administrations of both Woodrow 
Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. In his iconic book The City: The Hope of Democracy (1905), Howe argued that 
“rights of way upon the streets are but site values. Their value is created, as are those of the corner lot, by 
the growth of society.”60 He explained further in Privilege and Democracy in America (1910) that:  
 
The railway question is at bottom a land question. The railway is a monopoly 
because of its identity with the land. It is this that differentiates the transportation 
industry from other businesses. The right of way of a railway site is a site of land 
long drawn out. It is of much greater value than that of adjacent farms because of 
this fact. The particular site which it occupies cannot be duplicated. Terminals in 
the cities can only be obtained at a prohibitive cost. In many instances the only 
available routes through the mountains are already occupied. No new corporation 
could raise sufficient capital to force an entrance into New York, Philadelphia, 
Chicago, or any of the other large cities in the face of the opposition of the existing 
lines.61 
 
Johnson’s argument was amplified by progressives across the nation who followed his administration 
intently. Three years after Howe published The City: The Hope of Democracy, Delos Wilcox published the 
similarly named The American City: A Problem in Democracy (1909). In that book, he made an analogous case 
for the origin of streetcar monopoly, explaining:  
 
the streets being limited in width and tending to become crowded . . . a street 
franchise naturally gravitates toward monopoly. . . . One double line of tracks 
occupies so large a share of the street surface that in ordinary cases competing lines 
in the same street are not to be permitted to the public.62  
 
Wilcox’s influence expanded well outside of the boundaries of any single city. He served as the chairman 
of the Committee on Franchises of the National Municipal League, in which capacity he was the first 
recourse for municipalities across the country seeking guidance in valuation disputes.63 He was employed 
directly to advise and conduct valuations for franchise disputes in Grand Rapids, Detroit, San Francisco, 
New York, Los Angeles, Newark, St. Louis, and Denver.64  
Land monopoly was a concern in the highest levels of government, in part because Georgism 
experienced a revival in the 1910s. In 1909, David Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, began 
a campaign for a People’s Budget that would fund British social programmes with a land tax similar to 
George’s single tax. A titanic struggle that precipitated a constitutional crisis, it gave the land issue 
transnational salience, as leaders like Winston Churchill chastised the institution of landed property as “the 
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mother of all other forms of monopoly.”65 A year later, manufacturer and philanthropist Joseph Fels 
donated a fortune to found the Joseph Fels Fund Commission, devoted to propagating the single tax 
globally. The election of Woodrow Wilson as US president two years later brought a wave of officials from 
democratic, urban single-tax machines into federal office. These included officials formerly employed in 
Johnson’s administration, like Frederic C. Howe and Newton Baker. Thus, correspondence between 
Wilson’s secretary of war, Newton Baker, and George Peabody — one of the board of directors of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York — was characterized by a brand of radical discourse that rarely 
percolates up to the highest military official in the land. These included exchanges about monopoly in 
transportation being based on the “right of eminent domain” and that therefore the federal government 
must “recover . . . ownership” of the transportation system.66  
The persistence of land monopoly as a trope in public policy was also predicated on economic realities 
that made it true enough to be persuasive. The historian Richard John has highlighted the role of networks 
— built on extensive, contiguous land rights — in the formation of monopolies. Western Union, for 
example, monopolized telegraphy, despite owning inferior patents, because it negotiated right-of-way 
contracts with railroads that gave the firm exclusive access to networks of land. These rights-of-way 
allowed it to connect the entire nation and provide a utility other companies could not compete with.67 
Similarly, in dense urban areas the only space typically available for streetcars was the public roads, so 
entrance into that market was generally controlled by the municipalities that owned the land. 
Municipalities were limited in how much of the public roads they could lease because streetcars would 
produce congestion and could hit pedestrians. More broadly, most of the horror stories of monopoly 
seemed to be concentrated in extractive industries like oil and in network industries like telegraphy. 
Concentration in retail, in contrast, seemed relatively benign, if not progressive, as the example of the 
benevolent, price-cutting entrepreneur Edward Filene would suggest.68 Thus, Tom Johnson argued that 
neither the size of firms nor their corporate legal form had anything to do with the problems of his age: 
“We have no right to say that competition, or combination and aggregation are in themselves evil or that 
they necessarily produce evils” only that “special privilege . . . produces the evil of excessive or 
discriminating rates.”69 
Georgism tended to promote answers to the utility issue that were radical but nuanced in their focus 
on land. If natural monopolies were constituted by land, logic dictated that nationalization of land was the 
answer to natural monopoly. The country’s leading single-tax periodical, The Public, frequently argued that 
regulation was only a useful palliative to the extent that it would point toward public ownership: 
 
government ownership of public utilities would eradicate the evils of private 
ownership of government, whereas government regulation will intensify them. 
But regulation has the merit of being a necessary step toward ownership. The 
people, already aroused to the inequity of private ownership of government 
functions, will probably have to see for themselves the futility of regulation before 
they go the length of applying the only effective remedy.70 
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Although The Public had never blinked at the prospect of “government ownership” of railroads, it 
moved only hesitantly toward “government operation.” Its editorial staff ideally preferred government 
ownership of rights-of-way, which would be leased out, in a system akin to access pricing, to multiple 
private providers. Georgists progressively abandoned this solution as impractical, but that they entertained 
the idea indicates how they tried to disaggregate competitive capital from monopolistic land, leaving the 
one free and socializing the other.71 
After Tom Johnson died in 1909, his associates remained at the forefront of utility reform. In 1915, the 
Conference of American Mayors met for a special session on utilities. Newton Baker, Johnson’s hand-
picked successor as mayor of Cleveland, presided over the day devoted to public ownership. This was a 
symbolic statement of Cleveland’s centrality to that cause, but it only scratched the surface of the human 
and intellectual capital Cleveland provided. Frederic C. Howe gave the presentation that immediately 
followed Baker’s opening address. Other associates of Johnson, including Edward Bemis and Robert 
Crosser, spoke.72 The Conference of American Mayors concluded with the formation of the Utilities Bureau. 
A year later the bureau held a conference on valuation at which Johnson’s associates A. B. du Pont, Newton 
Baker, and Edward Bemis spoke.73  
The first meeting of the Utilities Bureau dealt with the seemingly esoteric topic of railroad valuation. 
Most participants spoke in favour of assessing utilities at their original cost, instead of the standard of 
reproduction cost endorsed by the Supreme Court in Smyth v. Ames (1898). Because the Supreme Court 
affirmed that railroads had a right to “reasonable” returns of the “fair market value” of their property, 
determining the value of utility property was essential for regulation, taxation, and public purchase of 
railroads. The court’s decision to value property at the price that it would cost to reproduce it (reproduction 
cost) was meant to favour the public. Valuing property at what the company spent (original cost valuation) 
would encourage railroads to inflate costs by overspending and inventing imaginary expenses.74 Halbert 
Gillette, the chief engineer of New York, was, however, one of the few participants at the conference who 
made the case for reproduction cost valuation. He noted: “Marconi should be and is rewarded for doing 
away with the necessity of trans-oceanic cables. . . . [F]air return on investment . . . would positively 
penalize genius, and, in practice, it does penalize both genius and normal ability.”75 
Even though the principle of original cost valuation seemed to leave the public open to chicanery, the 
reformers at the first conference of the Utilities Bureau favoured it because of its impact on the assessment 
of land. Edward Bemis, an erstwhile economics professor who had joined Johnson’s administration, gave 
one of the conferences’ headlining speeches in favour of original cost valuation. Bemis argued that 
reproduction cost was a way of claiming land values that had exploded since and — in part because — 
track had been laid. He argued that under reproduction cost “the price . . . cannot be reduced, lest 6 per 
cent to 8 per cent be not earned on this unearned increase in the value of land.”76 The valuation system 
mandated by the courts forced the public to set utility rates that did not reflect actual investment so much 
as the rising value of land. Like George, Bemis understood land value to be a function of urbanization: “A 
few sky-scrapers go up between the Grand Central and the Pennsylvania stations, in New York, enhancing 
                                                 
71 The Public, 5 May 1906.  
72 Proceedings of the Conference of American Mayors on Public Policies as to Municipal Utilities (Philadelphia: American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 1915). 
73 “Proceedings of the Conference on Valuation Held in Philadelphia, November 10th to 13th,” The Utilities Magazine 
(January 1916), 85–87.  
74 Richard White, Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011). 
McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 59–60. 
75 “Proceedings of the Conference on Valuation Held in Philadelphia November 10th to 13th,” The Utilities Magazine 
(January 1916), 24.  
76 Ibid., 36. 
History of Intellectual Culture, 2014-16 
 
12 
the site values at those depots. In consequence, the freight and passenger rates from New York to San 
Francisco must be raised.”77 
Bemis’s views evidently predominated at the conference: most participants were opposed to 
reproduction cost valuation because it permitted the capitalization of land values. H. Findlay French, an 
attorney from Baltimore, admitted that original cost valuation allowed companies to claim the value of 
inefficient spending but still argued for it because:  
 
If . . . the utility is to be allowed full value for every item in the plan in disregard 
of the fact that a more economic and efficient one could be constructed at the 
present time, then there are also equities in favor of the public, such as actual costs 
of rights of way, land, etc. which should be taken into consideration.78  
 
John Eshelman, former President of the California Railroad Commission, spoke on a panel devoted to the 
topic of land in utility valuation. He observed that railroad land was obtained through eminent domain 
and was thus under a “servitude” that should legally bar utilities from claiming the “unearned 
increment.”79 Hammond Hayes, a consulting engineer from Boston, argued for evaluating fair market value 
with a combination of reproduction and original cost, but suggested that rising land values made 
reproduction cost valuations overly generous: “Unquestionably the normal market price of land has been 
increased by the growth of the community due largely in most places to the presence of the railroad.”80 
Hayes mirrored George’s logic by arguing that the value of land was proportional to the growth of the 
community and hence belonged to the community.  
By the 1920s, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) relied increasingly on original cost valuation, 
and the rising professional consensus about the impact of land values on assessment seems to have been 
foundational to that decision.81 Joseph Eastman, Commissioner of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
argued against reproduction cost valuation because it allowed for inflated valuations based “largely on 
estimates of land values which have increased since the land was originally purchased or leased.”82 In fact, 
when Bemis gave his speech to the Utilities Bureau in 1916, he was already helping to shift the ICC’s stance. 
At the time, he was serving as a member of the Advisory Board of the Valuation Division of the ICC.83 By 
popularizing original cost valuation, Bemis simplified a complicated debate with murky implications for 
the public into a question about a single factor: land. This decision was grounded in a belief system that 
portrayed the uncompetitive features of railroads as predicated exclusively on their ownership of rights-
of-way.  
 
Water Power, Conservationism, and the Legacy of New Liberalism 
 
The idea that land was at the heart of monopoly would have even deeper implications as it meshed with 
the rising conservationist movement. As Roosevelt’s Chief Forester, Gifford Pinchot had been instrumental 
in developing the conservationist agenda. However, he recalled obtaining a sense for the economic 
importance of land only after President William Howard Taft took office in 1909. Then it was revealed that 
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a group led by Clarence Cunningham had flouted homesteading laws by filling thirty-three claims for coal 
land in Alaska and then selling these claims to a syndicate associated with J.P. Morgan. According to 
Pinchot, the “Pinchot-Ballinger Controversy” revolutionized his thinking. He realized that “the saving of 
natural resources for the benefit of the people through the conservationist movement involved the whole 
monopoly question. At first the idea seemed to me fantastic,” but then he concluded “that the concentration 
of natural wealth in the hands of monopolists is one of the great problems of conservation.”84 
After the controversy, Pinchot’s speeches called with increasing stridency not just for conserving 
resources, but for conserving them “for the people.” This turn of phrase meant that conservationism was 
not just about protecting resources, but about who owned them. Pinchot observed “the American people 
have evidently made up their minds that our natural resources must be conserved. That is good. But it 
settles only half the question. For whose benefit shall they be conserved — for the benefit of the many, or 
for the use and profit of the few?” Pinchot argued that resources should never be alienated from the 
commonwealth, but that they should remain the property of the nation, leased for public revenue. The 
alternative was “excessive profits from the control of natural resources, monopolized by a few.”85 
New Liberalism remade Ricardo’s critique of landed property into a wedge that split open laissez-faire, 
justifying progressively larger encroachments on private property. This doctrine also made 
conservationism more relevant to the broader progressive agenda. Although Pinchot echoed some Georgist 
tropes about “unearned” profits and communal property rights, he was probably never a devout single-
taxer. However, beginning with the Pinchot-Ballinger Controversy, Gifford’s younger brother — the 
avowed single-taxer Amos Pinchot — became an important ally, co-writing much of Gifford’s material, 
often pushing it in a decidedly Georgist direction.86 Moreover, Gifford’s National Conservation Association 
(NCA) reached out with increasing frequency to single-taxers for research, publicity, and lobbying. Internal 
memos show that the NCA believed that the trope of “land nationalization” would expand interest in its 
agenda.87 As a Republican, Pinchot lost much of his influence in Washington during Wilson’s presidency. 
But single-taxers were predominately Democrats, and even those who had stuck with the party of free land 
despite its embrace of protectionism and imperialism had generally switched parties in 1912 because of 
Wilson’s promise to eradicate, rather than regulate, monopoly. Some Georgist Republicans, like William 
Kent, were perceived as essential for the president’s outreach to new constituents and had clout that 
Pinchot now lacked.88 
Water power was one of the clearest and most salient applications of Georgist thought to the 
conservationist agenda. In a public statement released in 1914, the NCA made the case that water power 
was a natural monopoly because it required access to unique sites of extraction: 
 
We should not forget that land value or monopoly profit is the heart of the water 
power question. All human experience teaches that this value will increase 
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enormously as population grows. Any legislation which prevents the public from 
retaining, so far as practicable this unearned increment is wrong in principle. 
 
The statement continued by indicating that regulation alone would not eliminate “undue profits” from “the 
monopoly value of water power sites.” The memo concluded that “this undue profit can be transferred to 
the public only as rental paid into the public treasury.”89  
The water power issue resembled the debate over replacement cost valuation in its emphasis on the 
capitalization of land values. Most of the water power bills drafted during Wilson’s presidency allowed for 
the private development of hydroelectric sites with federal regulation of the price of power. They 
furthermore, allowed for public recapture of sites after fifty years. The debate hinged on what price the 
federal government would pay to purchase privately developed dams, specifically whether developers 
would be able to claim the inflation of land values over their fifty-year tenure.  
Conservationists worked closely with Georgists to pass legislation that would keep the land value of 
water power sites in the hands of the public. In 1916, Gifford Pinchot and Harry Slattery of the National 
Conservation Association drafted a series of letters signed by the influential Georgist Congressman William 
Kent. One letter to Kent’s peers in Congress suggested that Congress should support a bill that “provides 
that actual cost should be paid for land, water rights, or rights of way, thus guaranteeing the future against 
having to pay rates based on community created values.”90 The NCA also employed Kent to lobby the 
president. Kent’s letter to Wilson asked the president to delegate the drafting of a water power bill to 
Secretary of War Newton Baker. Then, Kent wrote Baker encouraging him to support a bill that “provides 
that there shall be no unearned increment on lands or rights of way or water rights, but that they shall be 
turned over at cost.”91  
It might seem odd that conservationists would push for the secretary of war to draft the water power 
bill. But Kent noted that he believed Newton Baker “stands with us on the great question of public rights, 
as found in policies that represent control and use of our natural resources in the public interest.” 92 This 
conclusion was transparently based on the fact that Baker was a former official in Johnson’s administration 
who expressed a level of devotion rare in American politics; when asked to define his philosophy, Baker 
simply observed “I am a follower of Tom Johnson.”93 Woodrow Wilson, did, in fact, allow Baker to draft 
the water power bill in coordination with Secretary of Interior Franklin K. Lane and Secretary of the Navy 
Josephus Daniels.94 The Water Power Act allowed the federal government to confiscate “excess profits” 
from private hydroelectric projects and to purchase dams for the price of land and capital at their original 
value.  
Baker’s most important contribution to the question of public water power was the National Defense 
Act of 1916, which he wrote in conjunction with Secretary Daniels. That act allowed the War Department 
to purchase land and facilities to produce nitrates for explosives and fertilizer.95 Under these provisions, 
Baker found sites in the Muscle Shoals region of the southeast to construct hydroelectric dams. Property 
owners, calculating that the Secretary would prioritize military expediency, agreed to sell the land for a 
proprietary stake in the project. They miscalculated his priorities; Baker refused to develop the land under 
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anything other than the strictest policy of public ownership.96 Baker won out in negotiations and the first 
plant was completed on 11 January 1919; the second, which he named Wilson Dam, would not be 
completed until 1927. The existence of two federally owned hydroelectric plants sparked a decade-long 
debate about public water power. 
In the fight that raged through the 1920s over the ownership of these dams, theories about land 
monopoly retained their centrality. The fight was principally led by Senator George Norris, and behind 
him was Judson King of the Popular Government League. The Popular Government League had, with the 
help of William Kent, been essential in securing Norris’ re-election after his opposition to the First World 
War nearly ended his career.97 Afterward, Norris allowed the Popular Government League to draft most 
of the legislation he proposed, including his bills for public ownership of water power in Muscle Shoals. 
The Popular Government League echoed long-standing concerns about land monopoly during the 
campaign. The organization’s pamphlets argued that reproduction cost valuation was flawed because it 
allowed “the unjust capitalization of land values.” Reproduction cost valuation, King argued, allowed 
monopolies to keep “the increase of land values — due almost wholly to social growth and the labor of an 
entire community.”98 
Tom Johnson’s administration remained surprisingly relevant in the fight over water power in the 
1920s. During the debate over the dams at Muscle Shoals, Norris reached out to Baker to testify about that 
project, and Baker helped campaign against Henry Ford’s bid to purchase the dams. However, when Norris 
solicited Baker’s support, he was as concerned about Baker’s utility policy in Cleveland as he was about 
Baker’s role in developing the two dams at Muscle Shoals.99 Baker’s account of the Cleveland plant’s 
development was cited by Norris at length in congressional debates on Muscle Shoals.100 Because power 
had essentially been a local question, municipal projects naturally would be an important reference point 
for federal debates about public power. But the Cleveland example was cited with especial regularity, so 
that by the end of the 1920s some senators cited the local rate structure in extemporaneous debates, 
suggesting that they had committed to memory many of the financial details of the Cleveland operation.101  
The Cleveland plant was so often discussed because it was a peculiarly good example of a “public 
yardstick.” Public power was not uncommon, but it had typically been developed in small towns that 
private providers believed lacked the proper scale to justify investments in infrastructure. Thus, few 
examples of direct competition between public and private providers existed, and critics often claimed that 
cheap public plants in small towns were unrepresentative of the cost of operating a big-city plant.102  
The circumstances under which public power had been developed in Cleveland made it a uniquely 
powerful example of the superiority of a public yardstick to regulation. Before Cleveland developed its 
public plant, the private Cleveland Illuminating Company had convinced a state regulatory commission 
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that it could not possibly distribute electricity for less than 10 cents per kWh. Six months later, the public 
plant opened, inaugurating a rate of 3 cents per kWh. To remain competitive, Cleveland Illuminating 
Company halved its rate to 5 cents per kWh. Norris emphasized in Senate debates that Cleveland 
Illuminating Company had successfully misled regulators about operating costs, but that public 
competition had forced them to reduce rates. According to Norris, the example “goes quite a distance 
toward demonstrating that regulation, while perhaps bringing much benefit, is far from being an efficient 
and complete remedy.”103 
Norris fended off Henry Ford’s bid to purchase the water power plants in Muscle Shoals, but the debate 
about what to do with the plants only grew over the course of the 1920s. In New York, Governor Franklin 
Roosevelt appointed Frank Walsh, a long-time advocate of the single tax, to a state commission on utility 
regulation. Walsh wrote Judson King for data on the Cleveland plant, which he used to argue that utility 
regulation was ineffectual and that public ownership was the only realistic option.104 Roosevelt endorsed 
Walsh’s minority report, which he then used as justification for his struggle to establish a public yardstick 
with hydroelectric power from the St. Lawrence River. In his first presidential campaign, Roosevelt built 
on this experience to argue for public ownership of the two plants in Muscle Shoals. Upon his election as 
president, he expanded them into the larger network of power plants known as the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA). The TVA, which was responsible for developing public housing, agricultural 
programmes, and an extensive network of public water power, became one of the nation’s preeminent 
examples of activist land and utility policy.105  
As David Ekbladh has shown,106 New Deal Liberals advocated for the TVA as an international model 
for liberal modernization. At the heart of this equation was a paradox; regional planning, while involving 
a considerable expansion of public power, was perceived as an alternative to the state regimentation of 
fascism and communism. This paradox was resolved, as Ekbladh notes, by evoking the rhetoric of value-
neutral modernization and emphasizing the TVA’s democratic decision-making procedures. But the 
National Recovery Administration arguably exhibited both features and yet was subject to trenchant 
criticism from progressives who assailed it as illiberal. The difference rest, in large part, on the fact that the 
TVA drew on established beliefs that land and utilities were particularly fit for state management. Stuart 
Chase, whom Ekbladh highlights as a prominent advocate of the TVA, was a conservative business student 
when he encountered Progress and Poverty in the Harvard University Library. In the ensuing “nine hours a 
sword had flashed and cut” that leading New Dealer “off from the cumulative ideology of twenty-three 
years.”107 Eugene Staley, who was at the forefront of internationalizing the TVA model, began his academic 
career with a book on the history of the Illinois State Federation of Labor that highlighted the influence of 
that “great book Progress and Poverty” on the development of the labour movement.108 In justifying the TVA, 
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Stanley argued that it was different than state ownership of capital, noting “we can have a TVA . . . without 
nationalizing all the enterprises along Main Street.”109  
By the 1930s, only a handful of old-time reformers were still doctrinaire Georgists. But, the New 
Liberalism continued to push the New Deal toward an emphasis on land and utilities. Raymond Moley, 
who organized F.D.R.’s brains trust, spent his boyhood pretending that he was a radical orator by reciting 
Progress and Poverty in the woods.110 Tom Johnson was always Moley’s lodestar, and Moley argued that 
George’s concept of social value was a revolution in the philosophy of property rights.111 One of Moley’s 
most consequential recruits to the brains trust was Rexford Tugwell. Tugwell often cited that quintessential 
economist of the New Liberalism, J.A. Hobson, when arguing that the government should increase 
consumer spending by nationalizing rent-seeking factors like land and utilities.112 He quoted Hobson to the 
effect that “as regards mineral rights, industrial power, future site, and other land values” what was 
required was “not merely control but ownership i.e. the conservation to the people of specific property 
rights.”113 Tugwell wrote extensively on the history of Tom Johnson’s administration, ultimately 
concluding that “of all the possible choices between private and public activity — not excepting the utilities 
— the ownership and management of land and the manipulation of its values had perhaps the most 
disastrous consequences.”114 Tugwell advocated comprehensive, national, industrial regulation, but in 
regards to land he fought to establish “not merely control but ownership.” He served as the head of the 
Resettlement Administration, which managed approximately 100 government-owned towns during the 
1930s. 
 
The Agrarian Myth 
 
The traditional explanation for America’s obsession with land was Richard Hofstadter’s “agrarian myth.” 
This “primitivist” myth had “almost universal appeal” among Americans in the eighteenth century and 
fostered a faith that “the property of working landholders has a special claim.” Americans, infatuated with 
their agricultural self-identification, focused on land reform even when farming had ceased to be the focal 
point of the national economy. This agricultural myth was, Hofstadter believed, irrational. Policies 
stemming from this myth were part of an inchoate belief system, lacking in consistency. Its exponents 
tossed around terms like “monopoly” without any analytical precision to denote forces that imperilled the 
well-being of the small farmer.115  
The work of Elizabeth Sanders, Michael Kazin, and Charles Postel has reimagined the radical farmer 
into a heroic and astute figure, making Hofstadter’s condescension ostensibly anathema to most modern 
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scholars.116 But, historians still have a poor understanding of the class of progressives who wanted to 
eliminate rather than regulate monopoly. These progressives have often appeared to have an imprecise 
understanding of monopoly, in part because historians have retroactively established a modern definition, 
predicated on concentrated or even exclusive ownership. The historiography has evolved from the overt 
condescension of Robert Wiebe, who proclaimed that the single tax was a “magical formula to reduce the 
complex dilemmas of an industrial society to the simple moral equations of small town America.”117 But 
historians still lump together anti-monopolists as “populists” — a term that evokes downtrodden agrarians 
— and figure them as opponents of an inevitable, even progressive process of corporate accumulation.118 
John Thomas’ Alternative America, arguably the standard text on Henry George, follows bluntly in 
Hofstadter’s steps by declaring that “in preceding from rent and monopoly to the theme of land and the 
fecundity of nature, George was evoking an agrarian mystique that the great majority of Americans 
understood.”119 Backward-looking and agrarian, anti-monopolists are still scarcely more rational than they 
were when The Age of Reform was published. For Martin Sklar, monopoly was so incoherent a subject that 
“for a public figure to declare against ‘monopoly’ was really besides the point, if not a deliberate method 
of evading or obscuring the issue.”120 
In fact, some of the forces that helped to define the American focus on land and utilities were urban, 
transnational, elite, and intellectually consistent to the point of rigidity. Americans inherited from British 
classical liberalism the notion that land was monopolistic. While liberals used the term “monopoly” in 
ways incongruous to the modern reader, they employed a traditional definition, denoting any market 
imperfections created by limited supply. Urban policy professionals ensured that these ideas reached 
fruition through complex, technocratic policy manoeuvres.  
It seems incongruous that, with factories across the nation shuttered during the Great Depression, the 
New Deal sought only to regulate industrial agents even as it took huge strides toward direct public 
ownership of land and utilities. However, if Americans neglected the most vital factors in a rapidly 
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industrializing economy, it was not out of irrational sentiment. Instead, they did so, at least in part, out of 
ideological consistency — a faith dating back hundreds of years that certain sectors of the economy could 
never be competitive. Ultimately, these sectors were socialized not despite but rather because of a faith in 
competitive capitalism. 
